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1991-92 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCKET
Administrative Law and Labor Law:
The Supreme Court's 1991-92 Docket
MARSHALL J. BREGER"
MR. ROSS: Thank you, Judge Wald. Our next speaker is the Solici-
tor of the Department of Labor, Marshall Breger. Marshall, as many of
you know, served as the distinguished Chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States for a number of years.
MR. BREGER: Thank you very much. It is really a delight to be
here and not to be in Chairman Ross's shoes at this time.
Judge Wald has captured all the administrative law movies of the
year. Thus, I am just going to have to be a bit of a deconstructionist,
and I will title my talk "Husbands and Wives." I will leave it to those
assembled to figure out, or perhaps freely associate, the overarching
meaning of this talk-let alone its relation to Woody Allen.
More seriously, it is a pleasure to be here, before so many of my
friends and former colleagues, to give you my thoughts as Solicitor of
Labor on last year's Supreme Court term in administrative law. Of
course, when I served as the moderator of the panel last year, I had the
luxury of being impartial and objective. Now that I supervise some six-
hundred aggressive government attorneys, I have developed more of a
litigator's perspective on such matters. You will forgive me if I examine
some recent administrative law developments in the Supreme Court
focusing on the labor law area. I think I can offer more insight into
those administrative law cases that affect the Department of Labor.
Let me start off by noting that traditional employment cases did not
play a prominent role in last year's Supreme Court docket. There was
only one NLRB ruling,' one case addressing Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA),2 and one case, involving Title
* Marshall J. Breger is a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washing-
ton, D.C. He has served as the Solicitor of Labor in the Bush Administration, and
previously served as Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan from 1983 to 1985.
Mr. Breger was also the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States from 1985 until 1991.
1. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (holding that employers
have right to exclude non-employee union organizers when reasonable alternative
means of access exist).
2. See Woodell v. International Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 112 S. Ct. 494
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VII,3 that was in reality a ruling under the Internal Revenue Code.4 On
the other hand, the Court decided seven cases that either directly in-
volved Labor Department programs or the Labor Department.' I think
this demonstrates a trend in which much of the action under the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Title VII is settled in the lower
courts. An increasing proportion of Supreme Court labor cases is com-
prised of matters arising under ERISA,6 OSHA,7 LHWCA,8 and other
Labor Department programs. Most of these cases have clear administra-
(1991) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction under section 301 of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) extends to suits on union constitutions brought by indi-
vidual union member, and that member has right to jury trial under Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) on damages claim for lost wages).
In this case, a union member alleged that because of his opposition to pro-
posed union actions, the local violated Title I of the LMRDA by discriminating
against him in job referrals. Id.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).
4. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (holding that back pay
awards in Title VII settlements are not excludable from gross income).
5. See Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 112 S. Ct. 487 (1991) (holding that
maritime worker whose occupation is defined in Longshore and Harbor Workers Com-
pensation Act (LHWCA) may also have seaman status under Jones Act); King v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991) (holding that under Veteran's Reemploy-
ment Rights Act (VRRA), rights to civilian reemployment are not limited by length
of military service); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992) (hold-
ing that statute requiring employer that had withheld worker's compensation benefits
and reliance on earlier statute to repay benefits does not violate Contract or Due
Process Clauses of Constitution); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct.
1344 (1992) (holding that under Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), it is correct to use traditional agency law criteria in defining "employee");
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992) (holding that under Bankruptcy Code
and ERISA, anti-alienation provision in qualified pension plan is restriction on
transfer, and enforceable under non-bankruptcy law); Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992) (holding that state regulation of occupa-
tional safety and health issues not approved by Secretary of Labor, and for which
federal standard is in effect, conflicts with purposes and objectives of Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA)); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct.
2589 (1992) (holding that, under LHWCA, worker who has settled with third party,
and whose employer is not statutorily obligated to provide compensation, forfeits all
future benefits from employer). These constituted 6.4% (seven out of 110) of the
cases decided by the Court last term.
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988).
7. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
8. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
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tive law implications.
As all of you know, the most important administrative law develop-
ment in the last several years has been the Court's implementation of
the method of statutory construction set out in Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council Inc.9 Under this now familiar formulation,
when a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute, it first asks
if Congress has spoken to the question at issue. It thus gives primary
effect to the plain statutory language and places secondary reliance on
the legislative history and statutory structure. If Congress has not spoken
to the issue, or has done so ambiguously, a court cannot impose its own
construction on a statute. It must uphold the agency's interpretation if
that interpretation is based on a permissible reading of the applicable
statute.
Again, to repeat black letter learning, Chevron imposes a two-step
analysis. First, the court must attempt to discern Congress's intent, using
traditional tools of statutory construction. If that is not possible, the
court must look to the agency's reasonable construction of the statute. I
will spend most of my allotted time discussing recent applications of
these principles.
The notion of judicial deference to agency interpretations of their
statutory and regulatory regime is rooted in a proper respect for the
legislative delegation of policymaking responsibilities. It recognizes that
the agency designated by Congress to administer a statutory regime on a
day-to-day basis should have substantial discretion in the discharge of its
duties.
Those of you who were here last year will recall a very stimulating
discussion on Chevron led by Professor Sargentich. One case that was
not discussed, however, was Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission.'" This was understandable, because, curiously,
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991). In this case, the Secretary of Labor issued a citation
to CF & I Steel Corporation, having found that CF & I had equipped some of its
employees with loose-fitting respirators that exposed- them to impermissible coke-oven
emissions levels. The Secretary also assessed a monetary penalty against CF & I for
violating a regulation promulgated by the Secretary, requiring an employer to institute
a respiratory protection program. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (Commission) vacated the citation, ruling that the facts did not establish a
violation of that regulation, which was the sole asserted basis for liability. The cited
regulation expressly requires only that an employer train employees in the proper use
of respirators, whereas another regulation-unmentioned in this action--expressly states
the employer's obligation to ensure a proper fit. Id.
25919931
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Chevron was not mentioned in the decision. Nonetheless, it was certain-
ly a Chevron case. From the Department of Labor's perspective, this
case is a very important decision on judicial deference, and therefore, I
would like to address it before proceeding to this term's cases.
Although we will also refer to the case as "CF&I," which was the
name of the employer involved, the case name in the Supreme Court
accurately portrays it as one of those rare legal battles between two
federal agencies: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), acting as the Secretary of Labor's delegate under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)," and the independent Occu-
pational Health and Safety Review Commission (Commission). Indeed,
the Commission considered the case so important that it took the unusu-
al step of hiring an outside law firm to present its views in an amicus
brief to the Supreme Court.
The issue before the Court was "whether a reviewing court should
defer to the Secretary or to the Commission when these actors furnish
reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous regulation
under the OSH Act."' 2 We, of course, argued strenuously in favor of
deference to OSHA. A unanimous Court, in one of Justice Marshall's
last opinions, agreed, thus resolving in the Labor Department's favor a
troublesome split in the circuits.
The Court had interesting things to say, both about the split-agency
model, of which the OSH Act provides perhaps the foremost example,
and about the policies underlying the deference principle. It said that
within constitutional limits, Congress is free to separate the rulemaking
and enforcement functions from the adjudicative function, and to assign
them as it sees fit to separate independent agencies. The Court inferred
from the structure and history of the OSH Act, however, that Congress
did not intend for these functions to overlap. 3 Further, it held that the
interpretive function is a necessary adjunct of the rulemaking function.
Hence, the interpretive function resides entirely with OSHA and not
with the Commission, whose powers are purely adjudicative. a
It necessarily follows that the courts owe deference to OSHA's .inter-
pretations of its own regulations, and not to the Commission's, when the
competing interpretations are both reasonable. Such deference, the Court
said, was appropriate from a policy or institutional competence stand-
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
12. Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1175.
13. Id. at 1176.
14. Id. at 1176-77.
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point because of certain "readily identifiable structural advantages over
the Commission" that OSHA possesses. 5 Not only is it the author of
the regulation being interpreted, but as the enforcer of the Act, OSHA
"comes into contact with a much greater number of regulatory problems
than does the Commission," which sees only contested cases. 6
Judicial deference is rooted in the concept that the administrative
agency assigned lawmaking power by Congress has greater "historical
familiarity and policymaking expertise"'7 than the reviewing court. This
principle was also the deciding factor in concluding that Congress in-
tended OSHA, not the Commission, to have the authoritative power to
issue interpretations. Therefore, even under the split-agency model, vest-
ing the Commission, and ultimately the courts, with the power to review
first for consistency with the statute and then for reasonableness, is a
sufficient bulwark against bias or overzealous agency interpretation of its
own regulations.
In a somewhat muddled part of the decision, the Court held that
OSHA is owed deference even when, indeed perhaps particularly when,
its interpretations are embodied in an enforcement citation.'" It went so
far as to say that the Secretary's litigating position before the Commis-
sion, far from being a post hoc rationalization, "is as much an exercise
of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary's promulgation of a
workplace health and safety standard."' 9 Needless to say, we at the
Solicitor's office appreciate the level of deference that the Court chose
to give to our briefs. Nonetheless, in this somewhat academic context,
one can only wonder if the Court fully appreciated the implications of
giving Chevron deference to the advocacy positions staked out by a
government agency defending its actions in regulatory or enforcement
litigation.
Remarkably, the Court then suggested that less formal means of inter-
preting regulations, which the Court singled out to include interpretive
rules and enforcement guidelines, might be entitled to a lesser degree of
deference.2" Leaving aside the question of how an interpretive rule is
any less "formal" than an interpretation rendered as part of an enforce-
ment action, this raises in my mind the significant issue of how much
deference is owed to an agency interpretation as opposed to a legislative
15. Id. at 1176.
16. Id. at 1177.
17. Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1177.
18. Id. at 1178.
19. Id. at 1179.
20. Id. at 1179.
1993]
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rule. On this point, the Court was less than clear. In our briefs we ar-
gued that post-Chevron, an interpretation is entitled to the same defer-
ence as a legislative rule.
The Court, however, brushed past this argument without, I repeat,
without, even citing Chevron as authority for any part of the decision.
But there were at least mixed signals, however enigmatic. On the one
hand, the Court pointed out that "[t]he Secretary's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation is subject to the same standard of substantive
review as any other exercise of delegated lawmaking power."'" It also
pointed out, echoing Chevron, that the Commission, like a court, is
"authorized to review the Secretary's interpretations only for consistency
with the regulatory language and for reasonableness."22
On the other hand, the Court emphasized that the reviewing court
should defer to the Secretary only if the Secretary's interpretation is
reasonable, thus leaving the Commission and the courts somewhat free
to believe that the determination of reasonableness is theirs to make
under an arguably less deferential pre-Chevron standard. And the Court
cited the earlier Batterton v. Francis23 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.24
decisions for the proposition that less formal forms of interpretation are
"not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exer-
cise of the Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers" although "these
informal interpretations are still entitled to some weight on judicial re-
view."25
For my part, I am coming to believe that if anything, it makes more
common sense to give a higher degree of deference to an agency's in-
terpretation of its rules than to almost any other kind of agency utter-
ance. After all, the agency is commenting on its own understanding of
21. Id. at 1180 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7026(2)(A) (1988)).
22. Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1178.
23. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). In Batterton, plaintiffs challenged a Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare regulation that excluded from the definition of "unem-
ployment" those fathers who were unemployed because of participation in a labor
dispute, or because of conduct that would cause disqualification from unemployment
compensation under the relevant state unemployment scheme. The Court. held that the
regulation did not exceed the Secretary's authority. Id. at 425-26.
24. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). In Skidmore, plaintiffs sought recovery under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of overtime pay of which they had been deprived. Their
work time at issue was spent in general fire hall duties and in maintenance of fire
equipment, and was not considered overtime. The Court considered the Wage and
Hour Administrator's opinion as to whether such activities constituted work time, but
overruled him and held that these activities should be compensated as overtime. Id.
25. -Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1179.
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its own regulations. Presumably, the agency is more likely than anyone
else to know what it meant to say. In fairness, however, changes in
administrations, with resultant changes in both personnel and ideology,
somewhat mitigate the force of this point.
The Martin Court's approach is a more modest exercise of agency
discretion than interpreting a statute-that is, interpreting what Congress
meant when promulgating a binding legislative rule. And while this
approach admittedly may be intuitively reasonable, it does differ from
the old school that suggests, in Michael Asimow's words, that "one
reason the APA exempted interpretive rules from the pre-adoption re-
quirements was that such rules were thought to be subject to plenary
judicial review." '26
I note also that a few days later in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.,27 involving the extraterritoriality of Title VII, the Court addressed
this very point. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, opined that the
lesser deference standard under Skidmore and General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert2" is still applicable to agency interpretations. But Justice Scalia,
with characteristic vigor, strongly disagreed, saying that Chevron pro-
vides a single standard of deference.29
I doubt that we have heard the last of the debate. In the meantime,
those of us left to defend agency interpretations of less than pristine
reasonableness in the lower courts will ignore then-Judge Scalia's prior
post-Chevron admonition that "there is deference and there is defer-
ence," 30 and will continue to cite Chevron for our purposes.3'
With one significant exception, the Court continued to give deference
to the government's views last term, although I noted no major exten-
sions of the deference doctrine. The Court employed deference to some
extent in at least three cases, none of which involved a Labor Depart-
26. Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules
and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 563 (1977).
27. 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991). The Court held that the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation that Title VII applies to discrimination
against American citizens abroad should receive a lower deference standard from the
courts, in part because this was a recent policy change, was contrary to earlier posi-
tions, and lacked support in the statute.
28. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court stated that the EEOC guidelines in question
shall be accorded consideration in determining legislative intent, but not as much as
would be accorded an agency regulation. Id.
29. Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1236 (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil, 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
31. Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act I, sc. 3 (arguing
that "[t]he Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.").
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ment program. In INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights,32 a
unanimous Court, although again not citing Chevron, deferred to the
INS's consistent interpretation of one of its own regulations. This regu-
lation authorized the Attorney General to arrest excludable aliens, and
either to hold them or to release them on bond. It also contained a
condition forbidding employment pending a deportation determination.33
Again, in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, the Court unanimously deferred
both to EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act's permit require-
ments and to the federal agency's construction of Oklahoma's water
quality standards. This case is noteworthy, I think, because it cites
Chevron as a basis for upholding a federal agency's interpretation, as
Judge Wald said, of a state regulation.' In that sense, it is reminiscent
of Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,3" decided in 1991, in which the Court,
over a vigorous dissent on this point by Justice Scalia, deferred to the
Department of Labor's interpretation of Department of Health, Education
and Welfare regulations, stating that the Labor Department's interpre-
tation of another agency's regulation should be given deference.' Obvi-
ously, I liked that decision, too.
Finally, last term in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., a divided Court ruled that the statutory term "required"
was ambiguous in context, and thus deferred to the ICC's construction
32. 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991).
33. Appellants alleged that the Attorney General exceeded his authority in pro-
mulgating the regulation. The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, held that the regu-
lation allows the Attorney General to impose bond conditions in the case of aliens
who lack work authorization. Id. at 556. The Court did not address whether aliens
authorized to work could be subject to the "no-work" condition. Id. at 557. In sup-
port of its decision, the Court found the regulation consistent with its stated purpose
of protecting against the displacement of workers in the United States. Id. at 558.
The Court also found that various administrative procedures ensure that aliens detained
and bonds issued by INS will receive "individualized determinations." Id. at 559.
34. 112 S. Ct. 1059 (1992).
35. 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991).
36. See id. at 2535 (holding that Department of Labor's determination that inter-
im regulations were not more restrictive than those of Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, was reasonable, and therefore warranted judicial deference). The
Court asserted that because the Black Lung Benefits Act provides disability compensa-
tion for miners developing pneumoconiosis from coal mine employment, "policy-mak-
ing" authority should be delegated to the Department of Labor, and judicial deference
was warranted, provided that Chevron's reasonableness requirement was satisfied. Id.
at 2535 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.. 837,
845 (1984)).
[VOL. 7:237
1991-92 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCKET
of that term to mean "convenient or useful. 31 Commentators have de-
scribed this decision as reflecting the Court's "extraordinarily deferential
approach.""
Going from one extreme of deference to another, nobody can claim
that the Court was overly deferential to the government in Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB,39 the most significant and controversial labor case of last
term. The Court, led by Justice Thomas, held that employers do not
have to allow non-employee union organizers to distribute literature on
their private property. Rather, the NLRA protects such union organizers
only in rare instances in which employees cannot be reached by other
means, such as in an isolated mining camp.4"
In so holding, the Court rejected the balancing test adopted by the
NLRB for such union access cases.4 In a sweeping repudiation of the
NLRB, Justice Thomas stressed that, before addressing any issue of
deference, the Court must decide whether the agency's interpretation of
the statute is consistent with the Court's prior determinations of the
statute's true meaning. Applying this standard, the Court held that the
Labor Board's interpretation was inconsistent with the 1956 "black let-
ter" NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.42 decision, and thus must be set
aside.
The Court did not even remand Lechmere to provide the Board with
an opportunity to explain its rationale. It simply vacated. Justice White
wrote a stinging dissent, arguing that Chevron deference was due, be-
cause the Supreme Court had never ruled, not even in Babcock, that the
NLRA unambiguously addresses the access rights of non-employees, and
because of this, the Board's construction was permissible and entitled to
deference.43 Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Scalia, the champion of defer-
ence to administrative agencies, joined the majority.
37. 112 S. Ct. 1401-02 (1992).
38. William Funk, Supreme Court News, 17-4 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. & REG.
PRAC. 5, 6 (SUMMER 1992).
39. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
40. Id. at 849.
41. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). In Jean Country, the NLRB set out a
three-part balancing test to determine whether non-employee union organizers should
have access to an employer's private property. Id. at 14. The components of the test
were: (1) the degree of impairment to the employer's property rights, balanced against
(2) the employee's right to organize as provided in the National Labor Relations Act,
while considering (3) the organizer's reasonably effective alternative means of access.
Id.
42. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
43. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 852 (White, J., dissenting).
1993]
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Lechmere probably does not represent a retrenchment in deference
law. It is likely only a caution that, just as courts will sometimes go to
great lengths to find statutes ambiguous, they can find statutory certainty
when you least expect it, even from a convenient reading of prior cases.
A more cynical person than myself might be tempted to say that just as
there. is (or was) "deference and deference," so too "there is Chevron
and there is Chevron."
This brings me to the other group of cases I would like to discuss
briefly today-the Court's "plain meaning cases." As I have already
noted, none of the deference cases last term were Labor Department
cases. Rather, we were successful last term in persuading the Court that
our construction of any relevant statutes was consistent with their plain
meaning. In other words, we asked the Court to employ the first prong
of the Chevron test, and just leave it at that.
The increasing use of plain meaning analysis may be the Court's way
of avoiding a meaningful exploration of legislative intent and statutory
purpose. I will not add my views to the ongoing debate of whether this
is a good or bad development overall, except to say that I am glad to
see courts looking skeptically at statements of individual congressmen
and other often purposely created legislative history.'
Let me consider the plain meaning of four labor law cases decided
last term. In King v. St. Vincent's Hospital,45 the Court unanimously
agreed with the government's view that a provision of the Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Act (VRRA)46 includes no implicit reasonable-
ness limits on the duration of leave that must be granted by employers
for military training." 'As many of you know, the VRRA requires em-
44. For a recent example, see Bath Iron Works v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 113 S. Ct. 692, 700 (1993) (citing specific comments of
individual Senators in using legislative history to decide appropriate statutory interpre-
tation). In this case, the Court decided that hearing loss claims filed by either current
workers or retirees must be compensated under compensation system for claimants
suffering statutorily scheduled injuries, rather than under compensation system for
retirees. Id. at 700.
45. 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991).
46. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2027 (1988). This Act covers the reemployment rights of
those persons inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States who were required
to leave their employment to perform such duties. Id.
47. The Supreme Court in St. Vincent's Hosp. held that the petitioner's request
for a three-year leave of absence from the hospital to serve as a Command Sergeant
Major in the Active Guard/Reserve program was not unreasonable. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 112 S. Ct. at 572-73. The Court further stated that section 2024(d) of the
VRRA "places no limit on the length of a tour after which [a. veteran] may enforce
[VOL. 7:237
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ployers to grant leave requests for military training and to permit such
employees to return to their previous positions with no loss of seniority.
While this holding perhaps was not surprising in light of Operation
Desert Storm, it should be noted that most of the circuits that had con-
sidered the issue had grafted a reasonableness gloss onto the statutory
language.4" As Justice Souter noted, if he were "free to tinker with the
statutory scheme," he could reasonably accord significance to the length
of leave in determining the protections of the Act.49 But the Court held
that the relatively straightforward statutory leave language simply did not
permit such tinkering, or the use of a reasonableness standard.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Darden, we find a variation on
that theme. In that case, the Court unanimously held that ERISA's defi-
nition of "employee"'" incorporates traditional agency law criteria for
identifying master-servant relationships. Justice Souter, again writing for
the Court, noted that the statutory definition of "employee" did not offer
much guidance as to its meaning. But the Court nonetheless rejected the
Fourth Circuit's broad test based on its understanding of ERISA's poli-
cies and purposes.52 Instead, as it did earlier in the intellectual property
his reemployment rights against [his employer]." Id. at 575.
48. See, e.g. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. King, 901 F.2d 1068, 1072 (lth Cir. 1990)
(finding that employee's request for three-year leave for tour with National Guard was
unreasonable); Eidukonis v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 873 F.2d 688, 694 (3d
Cir. 1989) (holding that reasonableness standard was applicable to evaluation of
employee's request for military leave); Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Ingram, 811 F.2d
1464, 1468 (1lth Cir. 1987) (stating that judicial inquiry into reasonableness of leave
request must be limited and extremely deferential, beginning with presumption that
such leave is reasonable); Lee v. Pensacola, 634 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing that National Guard member who continued training after employer denied his
application to do so failed reasonableness standard). Contra Kolkhorst v. Tilghman,
897 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1990) (deciding that reservist's leave of absence to
participate in training under VRRA was not dependent on reasonableness of request),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 865 (1992).
49. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. at 573.
50. 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992). The Court held that, in determining whether Robert
Darden was an employee of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Corporation for the purpose
of receiving retirement benefits under ERISA, the traditional agency law criteria of an
employee would be applied. Id.
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1988) (stating "[tlhe term 'employee' means any
individual employed by an employer.").
52. The Fourth Circuit created a standard to determine whether an individual who
does not fit within the traditional concept of employee status should be considered an
employee in the context of ERISA's definition. First, the "employer" or sponsor of
the pension plan must have taken some action to create a reasonable expectation on
the part of the "employees" that benefits would be afforded to them; and second, the
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context, 3 the Court stated that where Congress uses a term that has a
"settled meaning under the common law,"5 such as "employee," the
Court will assume that Congress meant to incorporate that established
meaning, unless the statute indicates otherwise.5
The Court was so committed to the "settled meaning under the com-
mon law" approach that it even rejected the government's somewhat
broader alternative that would take account of the statute's remedial
purposes. In other words, at least in this case, the Court decided that
not only does a "plain" statutory meaning trump an agency's permissible
but somewhat innovative interpretation, but so too does a "settled"
meaning of an admittedly undefined general term.
The most difficult case for me last term, both personally and institu-
tionally, was another plain meaning case, Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co. 6 In that case, a divided Court agreed with our argument
based on the literal language of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (Longshore Act) that a claimant forfeits his workers'
compensation benefits if he settles a third-party tort claim without ob-
taining his employer's prior written approval. 7 This is true regardless
of whether the employer made benefit payments to the claimant or ac-
knowledged liability at the time of settlement.5" That puts the claimant
at the mercy of the employer, because he has to get approval before re-
ceiving a settlement.
In our brief to the Supreme Court, we argued for this result, although
we had taken a contrary position in the court of appeals. For this rea-
son, some people-and from the language of the case, I think this in-
"employees" must have relied on that expectation, by foregoing other significant
means of providing for retirement. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 796 F.2d 701,
706-07 (1986), affd, 922 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992).
53. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The
Court confronted the issue of whether a sculptor's work was a "work made for hire,"
as defined by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
54. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739).
55. Id. at 1349.
56. 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992). In this case, petitioner, a Nicklos employee, was
injured while working on an oil drilling platform owned by Transco. Petitioner, after
suing Transco, ultimately settled. Petitioner, however, did not receive a formal written
approval from Nicklos before settling with Transco, as required by the clear language
of the Longshore Act. Id. at 2591.
57. 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1988). The Longshore Act requires an employer to com-
pensate an employee engaged in maritime employment for disabilities or death. Id. §§
901-945, 947-950.
58. Id. § 933(g)(2).
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cludes several Supreme Court Justices5g-have assumed that the Solici-
tor General forced us to change our position. That was not the case. We
took that position after extensive staff conversations, culminating in a
six-hour meeting commencing one Sunday morning.
Like both the Court's majority and dissent, I was, and continue to be,
troubled by the outcome. That is because the Court's decision will al-
most surely result in the denial of benefits to some deserving claimants.
But I was convinced under the Chevron analysis that the plain meaning
of the statutory language compelled this result and required that we
change our position. This should provide, for better or worse, some
comfort to those who fear that Chevron has become unprincipled in the
hands of litigators, and result-oriented in the hands of courts.
In response to Cowart, the Labor Department is actively developing
an amendment to the Longshore Act to correct this statutorily driven
inequity. Thus, at least we are trying to follow the "rules of the game"
by asking Congress, and not courts, to correct plain meaning that has
injurious social outcomes.
The fourth plain-meaning ruling I want to discuss is the Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n' case that Judge Wald re-
ferred to earlier. It is primarily a preemption case, and it turned on the
proper construction of the OSH Act.6 The threshold question was
whether the OSH Act has any preemptive effect at all on state standards
that "supplement," but do not purport to displace, the federal OSHA
standards.62 As it turned out, this question proved troubling for the
Court, and is interesting in light of our Chevron discussion.
As amicus, we argued the Labor Department's longstanding position
that the OSH Act explicitly preempts such state standards, unless the
state has obtained approval for a state plan in accordance with the OSH
Act. We derived that construction from the language and structure of
section 18 of the OSH Act,63 which affirmatively directs states to have
federally approved state plans if they wish to continue to regulate issues
covered by an OSHA standard.
In our view, the clear negative implication of this language was that
states do not retain concurrent jurisdiction to regulate these issues out-
59. Cowart, 112 S. Ct. at 2597-98, 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun called the Director's change in position, "the Government's newly discov-
ered interpretation." Id. at 2599.
60. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
62. Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2381-82.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988).
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side of the state-plan process. If you have a state plan, you can regulate;
if you do not have a state plan, you cannot regulate. In twenty years,
every court that addressed the issue also had concluded, or at least
assumed, that the OSH Act was an express preemption statute.'
If you look at this case in Chevron terms, we were arguing that the
threshold preemption question should be decided at Chevron step one. If
necessary, we certainly should prevail in step two, because our interpre-
tation of the statute expressly preempting the states was, at the very
least, permissible. But neither we nor the Court framed the case to fit a
Chevron analysis. The Court split four-one-four on this fundamental
threshold issue.
Only Justice Kennedy in concurrence agreed completely with our
view that section 18 of the OSH Act unambiguously and expressly pre-
empts a related state standard. He noted that this statutory construction
was "confirmed" by OSHA's consistent interpretation of the Act.65
Meanwhile, Justice Souter, in dissent, found the statute to be ambiguous
at best, and therefore would have permitted the state to regulate work-
place safety as it pleased, so long as its standard did not conflict direct-
ly with an OSHA standard.'
But it is the plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor, in which Justices
Rehnquist, White, and Scalia joined, that I find so interesting. Like the
Kennedy concurrence, it also drew upon our analysis, but it did not
purport to give any deference to the Secretary's longstanding construc-
tion. Rather, construing the statute independently, the plurality stated its
agreement with Justice Kennedy that the text of the OSH Act provides
the strongest indication that Congress intended preemption in this con-
text. But it disagreed with Justice Kennedy that preemption that relies
on the negative implications of the text rises "to the level of express
pre-emption."'67 Nevertheless, the plurality agreed "that the implications
of the text of the statute evince a congressional intent to pre-empt
nonapproved state regulations when a federal standard is in effect,"'
and held that such regulations are preempted under implied preemption
analysis. Thus, the plurality rejected the Labor Department's notion of
the statute's plain meaning, while finding in the statute, ostensibly with-
out the added boost of deference, an "implied" meaning that served the
64. See Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2382 n.1 (citing cases supporting position that OSH
Act is preemptive statute).
65. Id. at 2388-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2391-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2386 n.2.
68. Id.
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same purpose. In other words, it supplied its own reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statute, rather than limiting its review to the reasonableness
of the agency's interpretation, once it decided that the statutory language
did not "plainly" express a preemptive intent. At least, the contested
language was not plain enough to satisfy the more stringent, clear, and
unmistakable intent test for express preemption.
Thus, Gade not only raises fascinating questions about the Court's
preemption jurisprudence, surely a topic of interest to administrative
lawyers, but also about the way the Court sometimes avoids a Chevron
analysis when reading statutes that are both ambiguous on their face and
the subject of an interpretation by the agency charged with their imple-
mentation. Viewed as a Chevron case, the plurality's approach is per-
haps perplexing. In hindsight, I wonder whether the plurality would have
joined Justice Kennedy in adopting our express preemption analysis had
we wrapped it up in a Chevron package.
But perhaps the Gade plurality becomes less perplexing if one thinks
of it as illustrating the limits of Chevron. It may just be that Chevron is
not suited to preemption cases where there are presumptions of statutory
construction going in the opposite direction. One might then argue that
the competing presumptions simply cancel each other out, leaving the
Court more or less free to pursue its own interpretation of congressional
intent.
Finally, I would like to offer a brief peek into the Court's next term.
One of the problems with trying to prophecy about Chevron is that you
cannot forecast the case that will turn on Chevron deference, and the
case that will turn on deference without citing Chevron. But the Court
may well make its next pronouncement on this subject in one of the
Labor Department's Longshore Act cases, Bath Iron Works v. Director,
OWCP.69 I will not attempt to describe the rather technical issues in
that case, but would note that the case involves contrary interpretations
by the Labor Secretary and the Benefits Review Board (Board), an
independent adjudicatory agency within the Labor Department. As in the
CF&I case, we are arguing that it is the Secretary (who is charged with
administering the Longshore Act), rather than the Board, who is entitled
to Chevron deference.
As you can see, in my view the relationship between administrative
69. 113 S. Ct. 692 (1993). As it turned out, a unanimous Court, per Justice
Stevens, affirmed on the basis of the Labor Department's construction of the Act
under a "plain meaning" analysis, without citing Chevron or addressing the "CF&I"
issue of whether the Secretary or the Board is entitled to deference. Id.
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law and labor law is significant and is evidenced in much of the Court's
work. Indeed, this is not mere theorizing, because how the Court deals
with administrative law issues impacts directly on how the Labor De-
partment, at least, does its job.
Thus, the struggle of the Court to understand the role of regulatory
agencies in the administrative state continues. But I think the debate
over deference and plain meaning must ultimately be considered in the
context of the debate over separation of powers. At the end of any
discussion, it is important to keep that truth in mind.
Thank you very much.
